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Fault Management Dimensions
• Fault Management is accomplished in several 
dimensions:
– Spacecraft Fault Tolerance, redundancy and 
margins
– Subsystem Hardware, Firmware and Software 
capabilities for Failure Detection Isolation and 
Recovery (FDIR)
– System-Level FDIR
– Role of the Spacecraft Crew and Mission Control 
Center (MCC) in Fault Management
Spacecraft Fault Tolerance
• How much system degradation can you take, and still 
accomplish your mission or bring the crew safely home?
– Independent Strings of HW/FSW for critical functions
• Power – Generation, storage and distribution.
• Avionics – Command & Control Computers, On-board Data 
Network
• Environmental Control – Cabin Air Revitalization, Pressure Control
• Guidance, Navigation & Control – Attitude Control, State 
Determination
• Thermal Control – Cooling Loops, and Heaters.
• Communications – Telemetry/Commands & Voice.
• Mechanisms – Mechanisms for Critical Equipment/Functions 
– Deployment of Solar Arrays, Radiator, Antennas, parachutes, etc
• Propulsion – Propellant Management, Engines
Spacecraft Robustness
• How much system degradation can you take, and still 
accomplish your mission or bring the crew safely home?
– Margins of Critical Consumables
• Power – Ability to accomplish the mission or preserve crew safety 
with half of power available
• Thermal –
– Ability to accomplish the mission or preserve crew safety with half of cooling 
loops + maximize thermal clocks upon the loss of heating/cooling
– Ability to survive at different attitudes for some period of time
• Air –
– CO2 removal capability
– O2 generation, humidity removal, etc
• Propellant – Maximizing the options to get to and return from 
destination (burns)
Subsystem FDIR Responsibilities
• Expectations for Each Subsystem
– Provide the necessary level of Subsystem FDIR over all components within 
Subsystem boundary
– Report all faults and health status
– Evaluate sensor inputs to determine their validity and infer sensor health
– Evaluate data inputs from subsystem components to determine validity and 
respond accordingly 
• Key Objectives of Subsystem FDIR
– To ensure safe operation of the Subsystem
– To maintain functionality through available local redundancy
– To prevent fault propagation beyond the subsystem boundary
– Provide the necessary monitoring and functional tests as determined by 
safety analysis to identify and report latent faults or hazardous conditions and 
support:
• Situational awareness for crew and ground
• Initiation of system-level and/or higher level recovery actions
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System-Level FDIR scenario
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DC-to-DC Converter Unit
Converts Power from Primary Voltage  ~150-160 Vdc to 123Vdc
DDCU has several FDIR capabilities due to it’s function, and the lack  
of such up-stream and down-stream
February, 2009 8
Subsystem FDIR Example- HW
DDCU HW FDIR
•Backup Current Trip = Iout > 65A for 95-
105 ms or current limit > 50-55ms
•HW FDIR has no functional inhibits
•Current Limit = The DDCU will limit the 
amount of current available to the load 
(Iout = 78-82 A) rather than regulate the 
secondary bus voltage. 
•DCE Overvoltage = 153 ± 2 Vdc for 10 µs
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Subsystem FDIR Example- FW
DDCU FW FDIR
• Secondary (output) 125% Overcurrent
trip= 57.5A < Iout < 65A for 99 ± 5 ms 
•Secondary (output) 150% Overcurrent
trip= 78A < Iout < 82A for 52.5 ± 2.5 ms
•Primary (input) under voltage trip= 90 -
115 Vdc for 115 ms ± 4 ms 
•Primary (input) Overvoltage trip= 173 -
182 Vdc for 3 ms 
DDCU Converter Trips off when:
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Subsystem FDIR Example- FSW
DDCU FSW FDIR
• Secondary (output) Overvoltage trip: 129 Vdc for 6 sec = 
Converter Off
This FDIR action is designed to protect downstream loads 
sensitive to higher voltage, i.e. computers, electronics
• Overtemperature trip: 
Conv Temp >190 deg F = Converter Off
PS Temp >175 deg F = Converter Off
Baseplate Temp >185 deg F = Converter Off
FSW Overtemp trip values are changeable
• Both FDIR actions (Voltage and Temperature protection) 
can be inhibited  - see display.
System-Level FDIR
• Correlate subsystem-level information to 
detect faults that propagate across several 
subsystems (FDIR)
• Isolate to source subsystem, LRU or LRU 
component (lowest possible), from multiple 
subsystem fault indications (FDIR)
• Perform multi-system recovery actions 
required to mitigate the effects of a fault that 
affects multiple subsystems (FDIR)
System-Level FDIR scenario
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Scenario 1 
EPS failure –Primary Power switch 6- causes the loss of power to half 
of the critical US LAB systems.  The nature and location of the failure 
allows system reconfiguration to recover the lost functionality. 
Resulting C&W
Subsystem vs. System-level Response
LA2B
DDCU
•DDCU Powers the Loop Pump, but also half of the valves required 
for subsystem FDIR to perform a proper reconfiguration
•Subsystem FDIR does not understand the nature of the fault (Pump 
failure) and tries to reconfigure = reconfiguration fails
System-Level FDIR scenario 2
Scenario 2 
EPS failure –Primary Power switch 1- causes the loss of power to half of the critical 
US LAB systems.  This failure prevents full system reconfiguration to regain lost 
functionality.  Root cause, affected components and operator actions identified.
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Fault Management Design
Integrated FDIR Design
• Integrated FDIR analysis includes three main activities:
– Bottoms up analysis: Identify all failure modes at subsystem level
• Functional Fault Analysis 
– Top-down analysis: Identify critical functions and impact of  their loss
• Loss of Crew/Loss of Mission (LOC/LOM) analysis
• Go/No-Go Tables
• Operational Functionality Assessment
– Requirement Allocation: Decomposition of FDIR requirements to:
• Subsystem-level (HW/FSW/FW)
• System-Level
• Crew
• MCC
• FFA is “Functional Fault Analysis” captures fault detection and 
response analysis from the subsystem level to system level FDIR
• Instrumentation Assessment ensures proper fault coverage in 
design 
Alternate Methods for FDIR Analysis
• Diagnostic/Testability Analysis tools (just to name two…)
– QSI TEAMS
– DSI eXpress
• Description/Benefits:
– Cause and Effect, Multi-Functional Model of the Failure Behavior 
of the System
– Graphical, Understandable way of representing the RM&T 
aspects of the design for the Life Cycle
– Testability features enable fault detection, isolation, and 
diagnosis capabilities
– Provide metrics of fault detection and fault isolation capabilities, 
various cases
– Models can be “recycled” for use in real-time diagnostic systems
TEAMS Modeling Approach
= Test point (TEAMS)
= Sensor 
= Module (TEAMS)
= LRU 
= Link (TEAMS)
= Fault Propagation
Path 
= Module (TEAMS)
= Failure Mode 
Sample TEAMS Model for Propulsion Subsystem
• Each module within a subsystem model is designated its own unique color
• Each test point is designated a color based on the source of document used to verify its existence
• Each link is designated its own unique color to differentiate between fluids, power, and data 
paths
• Each failure mode is designated a “hatched” color pattern
Multi-signal Dependency Modeling
Screen Shot of the
Model used in the 
ISS Demonstration
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Developing FDIR Modules - Fault Detection and Fault Isolation with TEAMS
Fault Isolation Example
Dependency matrix (D-matrix) is generated from the 
TEAMS Designer subsystem model
T1 T2 T3 T4
FM1 1
FM2 1 1
FM3 1
FM4 1 1
FM5 1
FM6 1
FM7 1
FM8 1
Failure 
Modes
(causes)
Tests (observables)D-matrix
1 = test can detect failure mode
FM1
FM2
FM3
FM4
FM7
FM8
FM5
FM6
T1
T4
T2
T3
FAIL
FAIL
PASS
PASS
Compute GOOD failure modes: Every failure mode connected to a PASS test is GOOD. 
GOOD
GOOD
GOOD
GOOD
BAD
Compute BAD failure modes: Every test that is FAIL has at least one failure mode that is BAD.
If there is more than one failure mode that leads to a FAIL test, then all failure modes not labeled as 
GOOD are labeled as SUSPECT.
SUSPECT
SUSPECT
SUSPECT
All remaining failure modes are labeled UNKNOWN: they are connected to tests for which we have no 
test information.  
Developing FDIR Modules - Fault Detection and Fault Isolation with TEAMS
Fault Isolation Example (cont.)
TEAMS Modeling
30
Testability Analysis
• Determine % Fault Detection & Isolation – if low, can redesign to add 
more sensors or others detection or inference means
• Identify General System’s metrics – Failure modes, Test points, etc
Real-Time Fault Management
Evolution of Systems/Fault Mgmt on-board 
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On-board Fault Management relevance to Ops
• Mission Control Center (MCC) - Level of dependency of the 
spacecraft and crew on tactical/real-time MCC support during 
nominal and off-nominal operations.  
– This includes the size of the team required for real-time 
operations, as well as mission preparation and planning.
• Crew Training - Training requirements associated with 
necessary crew involvement for nominal/routine system 
management, and response to off-nominal conditions.  
– If the crew is required to actively perform health 
monitoring, FDIR, and nominal routine system control = 
significant task and skill training is required.
• Flight Product development - Development of flight 
procedures and other products required by the crew and 
Flight Control Team (FCT) to manage the system and operate 
the spacecraft during nominal and off-nominal operations. 
On-board Fault Management relevance to Ops
• Engineering support - Dependency on engineering teams, 
outside of the FCT, to provide system expertise during 
nominal operations and support anomaly troubleshooting.
• Mission Planning - Detail required in pre-mission planning to 
support the execution of a nominal mission and provide 
sufficient margins for contingency operations.  
– This includes resource analysis, and timeline development, 
thus on-board capabilities for resource management, or 
greater availability of resources, reduces granularity 
required in pre-mission planning.
Key Fault Management Elements
• Vehicle Instrumentation & Displays
– Provide Crew and MCC insight into system performance, anomalies and 
current system status
– Enables identification and response to failures
– Provides sufficient insight to perform the mission specified for the spacecraft 
• Flight Data File
– Contains nominal, malfunction and reference procedures for the Crew to 
conduct their mission.
– Malfunction procedures support Fault detection, Isolation and Recovery when 
this actions are not performed by on-board systems
• Caution & Warning
– Alerts the crew to system failures that require their attention
– Information provided by aural tones, lights, and displayed information
– Level of information provided by the C&W system determines the crew 
response to the information.
C&W Message Classification
Caution and Warning Alert notification system for flight crew and ground that 
includes  Emergencies, Cautions, Warnings, and Advisories.
Emergency  
(Class 1 event)
Any condition that threatens the life of the crew or vehicle and 
requires immediate action.  Three specific conditions (event 
types) define the emergency class; fire/smoke, rapid change in 
cabin pressure and toxic atmosphere.
Warning 
(Class 2 event)
Any event that requires immediate correction to avoid loss of or 
major impact to the vehicle or potential loss of crew.
Caution 
(Class 3 event)
Any event that is not time critical in nature but further 
degradation has the potential to threaten the loss of crew, or the 
loss of redundant equipment such that subsequent failure could 
result in a Warning condition.
Advisory 
(Class 4 event)
A non Caution and Warning message which provides 
information about systems status and processes.
Fault Management on-board Orbiter
• Annunciator Matrix and On-board Fault Summary data based on individual 
conditions or pre-defined “hard-coded” rules = no dynamic correlation
• Failures that impact multiple components result in the generation of many 
seemingly unrelated messages that the crew needs to isolate = cryptic C&W
• Generated alerts are often not indicative of the real failure. E.g. ‘EPS bus 
‘undervolt’ failure generated ‘Fuel cell Ph low’ = crew diagnosis required
Fault Management on-board ISS
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 2 Identify Response Based Upon C&W Class 
Has an Emergency class event been annunciated? 
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•H&S driven from individual subsystem-level health 
mgmt data, not vehicle-level health state
•C&W data only one “piece of the puzzle” to determine 
the nature of the failure, and system propagation
•H&S data does not directly provide failure response 
information, or system impact severity
PCS
SSC C&W
Diagnose
Respond
•Each C&W message has associated procedures for 
crew or ground execution.  Diagnosis within procedures
Key FM Elements– Decision Support
• Decision Support Information
– Generation of actionable information for the Crew or Flight Controllers
– Required information to make a failure response decision
– Typical information required:
• Affected Components - System components that have lost partial or all 
functionality as a consequence of the root cause failure. 
– Power failure that also affects thermal control:  all components that have lost 
power + all components that start getting hot. 
• System-level impact - Components or functionality that performs critical 
functions and has been affected by, or is the root-cause failure. 
– A power failure cuts power to 4 loads: light 1, light 2, light 3, and main air 
conditioning unit.  Affected components are all four and system-level impact 
is the loss of air conditioning.
• Redundancy of Critical Components – Level of redundancy degradation of 
critical components
– In the Internal Measurement Unit (IMU) in the Shuttle, for example, the 
system is 2-fault tolerant, since there are 3 IMUs, and only one is necessary to 
perform the IMU system functions.  Upon the loss of one IMU, the system 
would be 1-fault tolerant.
• Critical-to Information - A system is “Critical to” any component that if 
failed, will prevent the system from performing its functions. 
– The IMU system is two-fault tolerant for individual IMU failures.  If two IMUs 
have failed, then the IMU system is critical to the non-redundant components 
that keep the last IMU functioning.
Learning from System Anomalies - STS
• STS 93 Electrical Short During ascent
– Seven seconds after lift-off, the Orbiter suffered a transient AC electrical short 
circuit 
– Failure Indications Onboard: ‘Fuel Cell pH’ message generated by the 
computer.  This message occasionaly occurs during ascent as a transient 
condition.  
– Root-cause: electrical short had momentarily dropped the AC bus voltage and 
a built-in self-check of the pH sensor had caused the message when the power 
was restored.  
– The crew was unaware of the real issue and the impact to the the health of 
critical systems for ascent.  
• Affected Components – equipment powered by shorted AC bus
• System impact – none
• Redundancy of critical components – 2 main engine controllers 0 Fault Tolerant to 
MEC, power and data
• Critical to:  MEC, Power and data components for affect MECs
– Crew Situational awareness based on sysem indications - none
Learning from System Anomalies - ISS
• ISS US C&C Failure
– STS-100/ISS 6A assembly mission in April 2001, the ISS 
suffered failures within the hard drive mass storage 
system of each of the 3 Command and Control (C&C) 
flight computers over several days. 
– Result: no command & control capability, no insight in 
system telemetry
– Factors that contributed to recovery:
• The ISS architecture comprised of US and RS segments – RS 
maintained critical capabilities
• The Space Shuttle was docked to ISS – providing additional 
comm capabilities and ATT control
• Systems Management functions in the ISS architecture are 
distributed 
– power generation, atmosphere control, attitude control, thermal 
control) are allocated within the subsystem control, between HW, 
firmware, tier 2 and local tier 3 computers.  
Learning from System Anomalies - ISS
• ISS RS C&C Failure
– At GMT 164:14:57, during ISS Assembly flight 13A, all six Russian computers (TsVMs & 
TVMs) became unavailable. 
– Both sets of RS computers  TsVM & ТVМ, are triplex systems, but a single design 
feature caused all six computers to fail 
– The following functions provided by RS segment became un-available:
• Oxygen generation (Elektron), 
• CO2 removal (Vozdukh)
• Propulsive attitude control, necessary in the event US MM is unavailable or unable to 
maintain control. 
• Power to SOYUZ severely limited, since US to RS power converters were off at the time of 
failure
– Factors that contributed to recovery:
• The ISS architecture comprised of US and RS segments – RS maintained critical 
capabilities
• The Space Shuttle was docked to ISS – providing additional communications 
capabilities and ATT control
• Systems Management functions in the ISS architecture are distributed 
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